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This project aims to elaborate the “ontology of withdrawal”. Its aimed field is not
restricted to philosophical discourse, but may also relate to the various genres of theories and
discourses: sociology, ecology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, urbanism, media theory and even
political economy, etc. For a long time, philosophy has grappled with the notion of the One
in order to acquire a vision of the world as a whole. The perfect comprehension of the One
is as a condition of enlightenment(for instance, as the “absolute knowledge” in Hegelian
dialectics or as the “ultimate Enlightenment”, Satori, in Buddhist discourse). Put differently,
philosophy has always somehow failed to comprehend the One. The One as a concept is
nameless or difficult to represent, so as to be never completely captured. The One is always
evaded and eclipsed in its singular movement of keeping distance from the presence or direct
access(by humans) to the existential world. However, philosophy never ceases to think about
the One in its variety of attempted styles. The same is true for some types of religious or spir-
itual discourse to a certain extent. In fact, the living world is always already articulated within
some differentiated structures of semantic articulations deriving from dichotomy, binary
oppositions, and duality within Nature toward/in front of the divergence of universes. 
What Whitehead called the “bifurcation of nature” seems to be adequate for understand-
ing the difficulty of grasping the One in this context(Whitehead, 2004, pp.30-31). There is
always an absolute decision invented by each philosophy and its “philosophical decision”
between the sensible or phenomenal appearance of the world: ‘the greenness of trees, the
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──Abstract
This essay is a part of my ongoing project, the “ontology of withdrawal”. In this introductory
section, this work begins with comparative interpretations of both philosophical projects by
François Laruelle and Toshihiko Izutsu. Some basic but quite idiosyncratic concepts by Laruelle
are clarified and explained: One-in-vision, One-in-One, non-philosophy, given-without-given-
ness, unilaterality, clone, dualysis, stranger-subject, and so on. Each conception is considered
and re-examined from the perspective of non-religious philosophy by Izutsu. Rather than being
contented with a mere demonstration of similar or compatible points in these two philosophical
systems, this paper would like to make some interventions for the recent philosophical debates
after the “so-called speculative turn” raised by Object-Oriented Ontology and Speculative Real-
ism. 
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song of birds, the warmth of the sun….and the feel of velvet.’(ibid, p.31) and its hidden mate-
rial reality (systems of molecules and electrons, ibid), which is compatible with the series of
conventional duality in philosophy; for instance, noumena and phenomena, the abstract and
the concrete, primary qualities and secondly qualities, and so on. Both thought and philoso-
phy are always caught up in this kind of duality — if they intend to access the reality in/as
the One. Then, the bifurcation is gradually and retroactively substituted by the process of
binary oppositions, splitting and dividing experiences into linguistic formalization of exis-
tences. Thus it is difficult to grasp the One.
In order to break up this challenge, there is an interesting notion of the One that can be
highlighted. In the account of the notion of the One, this essay addresses both philosophical
theories by French (non-)philosopher, François Laruelle and Japanese (religious, or non-reli-
gious) philosopher Toshihiko Izutsu. As for the latter’s arguments, I have so far addressed it
on several occasions (1).
Why does philosophy wish to think about the One? Because it can exist insofar as it
surpasses and sublates any empirical experiences. The notion of the transcendental was one
of attempted directions in philosophy. But, the notion of immanence is also present in both
the philosophy of Laruelle and Izutsu even, to the same extent, with a standard or conven-
tional philosophical lineage. For both philosophers, the One means the radical immanence
as given-without-givenness or separated-without-separation in terms of the incipient (in)artic-
ulation of the living world.The One has usually been categorized within the problematics of
ontology in conventional or standard philosophy. The question is: why and how does this
world or this body exist? Certainly, in occidental philosophy ontology in general has dealt
with a presence, manifestation, and revealment of Being among beings, while “so-called ori-
ental thoughts” has sometimes more directly focused on the notion of nothing(-ness) for their
ontological explanation of the world; although, Laruelle has already warned for a hasty com-
parison or association between Zen or Buddhism and his non-philosophy(PNP, 169).
In the context of this essay, the One is not same as that is referred to in Neo-Platonism.
The concept of One-all or univocity, inspired from Spinoza’s work, which is also employed
by Deleuze, doesn’t necessary imply the One in the Neo-Platonic sense. Spinoza will be
addressed in detail a to follow chapter of this project. The differences with Neo-Platonic
thought can be enumerated and explained as below. First, in Neoplatonism, for instance, the
One is always purely unique, omnipresent and simplified. But in our argument, inspired by
Laruelle and Izutsu, the One is foreclosed or excluded to the in-division of the One/multiple
in the ‘force of thought’ which is given anterior to any discursive conceptualization or sym-
bolization. Second, unlike Neoplatonism, the One of which I take account is not beyond
explanations by language, but instead enunciable in infinitely open-ended and deliberate dis-
sensus. Third, in the thought of Neoplatonism, the One deploys itself through the emanation.
Everything is the result of the emanation deploying from the One as the absolute or ultimate
being. But for Laruellian (non-)philosophy and Izutsu’s (potentially non-)religious philoso-
phy, the One operates through unilateral determination, which is nevertheless constituted or
assembled by mutual prehension (2) of things. The One just acts as/in-the-last-instance. It can
be also defined as the “determination-in-the-last-instance”, which seems to derive from
048 和光大学表現学部紀要　18 号・2018 年 3 月
Althusser’s Marxist philosophy, although its content here varies from that in his theory and
holds a different value, for our infrastructure or “base” is not limited to the (political) econ-
omy in the narrow sense, but is extended to a broader sense of organization and conjunctures
in general. For instance, ecology can provide another type of the unilateral base, and even
cosmological or shamanistic universes can hold the formation of a certain “economy”.
Fourth, for Neoplatonism, the One is always posited “over yonder” beings or even the very
Being as such. In other words, the One is located as an instance of the transcendence, while
in this project, inspired by Laruelle and Izutsu, the multiplicity of beings is just an existential
mode of the One and the “beyond” as such immanent to the One in the case of Being — in
the Heideggerian sense. Rather than positing the One as the transcendence, this project would
also conceive the One as the radical immanence(SU, 45, 99).
Here the term unilateral which is frequently utilized in Laruelle’s works must also be
clarified. It indicates a flight onward without return, in which there is no exiting or leaving
before the return nor a return without going out. It is a kind of exodus out from the framework
of representation and identification. There is just a single vector and singular movement,
which he calls unilateral. In his view, the non-philosophy is always unilateral, there is no
departure point(SU, 71). The unilateral causal relation is supposed between the One or the
Real, and our thought. This is just one way. Rather than an analysis in general concerning
the One as transcendental, dualysis — raised by Laruelle — explores the One as radically
immanent, with all putative differentiations and articulations.The term dualysis also indicates
the method of non-philosophy by utilizing varied philosophical resources, which is quite dis-
tinct from both the analysis in general and the synthesis in dialectics(FC, xxx). Dualysis
doesn’t divide its object, but explores it by cloning it in the unilateral duality and rejecting
the dialectic integration of two opposites(PNP, 187). The unilateral duality is a kind of syntax
of the semantic articulation which excludes the philosophical convention or commensurabil-
ity of standard conceptions(PNP, 127). 
What is the non-philosophy in Laruellian sense, and what does it mean by the non-reli-
gious (or religious-non) philosophy which I define — inspired by Izutsu’s thoughts? In order
to establish itself, every philosophical thought and position take crucial decisions which mark
and enact the borders of its own territories. A philosophy demands an outside of itself. In
fact, not only Laruelle, but also Deleuze and Guattari have already discussed the institution
of a certain exteriority of each genre of discourse: non-art, non-music, non-philosophy, etc.
In their last book, What is Philosophy? they say that ‘philosophy needs a non-philosophy
that comprehends it; it needs a non-philosophical comprehension just as art needs non-art
and science needs non-science.’(Deleuze&Guattari, 1994, p.218) The same holds true for a
religion and its exteriority to others. Every religious faith with some philosophical position
excludes and forecloses its constitutive outside in order to deploy itself. At the same time,
different religious positions which negate others and look incommensurable at each other,
however, might happen to share conceptually some translocal or some common platform at
some depths of thought and of the unconscious (as semantic layers within the asignifiant and
non-linguistic articulation), with which Izutsu tried to engage with as his lifelong research
project.
Certainly Izutsu’s expertise was philosophy in various religions(Islamic, Buddhist, Zen,
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gnosis, and Judaic, etc), but despite his very detailed studies of varied religious conceptions,
he never took any fundamental dogmatic position on any religious faith. His posture is never
reducible to a mere relativism, in any sense. His thought was always transversing different
religions and their philosophies by raising a transversal conceptual platform. In order to ana-
lyze the generic constitution of religions, the exterior position to other principles must be
taken into account. Izutsu explores the synchronic platform of religions in terms of their
semantic structures envisioned by the non-religious thought and its non-conventional philos-
ophy, rather than tracing back to a fundamental kernel of any religion or assuming a generic
history of religions. In the sense that Laruelle also provides the example of non-religion in
The Struggle and Utopia(SU,91), Izutsu’s non-religious philosophy can be somehow con-
firmed.
The term ‘vision-in-One’ by Laruelle is crucial for elaborating on the notion of the One.
For him the vision-in-One is the perspective or cognitive posture to avoid the bifurcation
which invites all forms of dichotomy and dualism in philosophical thinking. The vision-in-
One is a matrix of thought in which the One demands speaking/thinking in general(FDH,
290). It is the very non-relation as such, which overlaps with an unilateral duality. The vision-
in-One envisions the world as the being-given-without-givenness(SU, 33). Thus, it would
try to reach objects or things without any dichotomy or synthesis, which conventional philo-
sophical decisions constantly tend to invent and employ. The vision-in-One is not just a part
of the One, but rather immanent to the One itself. The vision-in-One is a radical immanence
as the existential and material choice of the vector directed toward a given philosophy. The
vision-in-One is capable of problematizing and criticizing philosophical decisions in its
immanent cause in order to eschew each philosophical position’s narcissism and hallucina-
tory effects. In this sense, the vision-in-One is equalized as the Real or at least, a radical
posture toward science in general. Both the One (in the sense of vision-in-One) and the Real
are always foreclosed to/for thought (or the ‘force of thought’) insofar as human cognitions
cannot directly reach them.
Through the One-in-One, our thinking from/within the One is questioning what does
‘as-One’ or ‘in-One’ signify, rather than simply asking what is the One. The vision-in-One
is also an attempt to face up directly with the One or grasping the One as itself/whole, not in
its totality. Laruelle thinks that the One here presupposes a kind of its own copy, simulation,
or clone. The vision-in-One is to be tuned with the One-in-One that indicates the radical iden-
tity as the last-instance, in which the varied dichotomies are superposed, rather than identified
in each philosophical formation. Both the One and non-One are effects of the One-in-One,
which also operates as a sort of clone of the One, and nevertheless, is not just its duplication
or replication. The One as One-in-One or vision-in-One is an unrepresented non-thetic expe-
rience or lived thought, and supposed without being identified or presented, that is,
given-without-givenness, Performed-without-performation, and the Manifested-before-all-
manifestation(PNP, 18, 56). In other words, Laruelle tries to convert the absolute immanence
in philosophy into a radicalization of non-philosophy which problematizes and unilaterizes
philosophical decisions.
The One is inalienable but is articulated by itself through non-philosophy, whereas the
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transcendental is not to be equivalent with the One or the Real, but rather it is the clone of
the One(SU, 38, FDH ,299). This is the reason why thinking, for Laruelle, is the clone of the
Real(FDH, 241). The notion of clone in Laruelle is defined as the ‘oeuvre-without-opera-
tion’(SU, 81) and is distinguished from that of simulacra, for it doesn’t assume any optical
meaning and is never reducible to kinds of mimesis. Instead, the clone is defined as the reflec-
tion without mirror(PNP, 138). The clone has nothing to do with a reflection or specular
simulacrum, but more aptly depicted as a reflection without a reflected, which is no longer
able to be set within the notion of simulation. Nevertheless, this notion is still very much
speculative, devoid of an optical nature of physical reflection. The clone in his non-philoso-
phy is concerned with the temporality producing or identifying the future permanently, at the
same time by affording the new concept of the past and the present rather than supposing
ecstatic structure of time(FC, 123). The clone is real, in the sense that, cloning is a virtually
or an immanently existential mode of the determination-in-the-last-instance. (SU,9 9) Even
the subject is defined as clone of the ego(PNP, 107), which is what we would call an instance
of unilateralization(SU, 143). 
Is it possible to contend that to know is to think in terms of the One or to withdraw into
the One or even becoming the One? That is the question which is to be scrutinized. In this
project, the notion of the One is analyzed (or even dualyzed) along with that of the Nothing
(or nothingness) as well. Thus, in this essay, the term ontology means the thought of a with-
drawal of beings, objects, things, and (both human and non-human) existences, rather than
that of the presence or manifestation of Being or beings. Although it is often located as the
ground of the presence of beings in most of western philosophy, insofar as the One is con-
stantly vanished from the appearance of presentation as such, a fragile character of existences
is in itself analyzed in terms of withdrawal in this project.
Objects don’t contact or relate to each other. They are not set in any relation. Objects
cannot be accessed by human beings. This simple thesis is a quintessence of Object-Oriented
Ontology(OOO), in a version which Graham Harman has succinctly formulated so far in his
works on many occasions(Harman, 2010, 2013). In this view, objects never encounter each
other, nevertheless, objects can relate to one another in a certain translation or allure (this
point will be scrutinized later). Here objects aren’t posited as an opposite term of subjects.
The recent discussion in continental philosophy(Object-Oriented Ontology = OOO, Specu-
lative Realism = SR, New Materialism = NM, Actor Netowork Theory=ANT, etc) crucially
criticizes the whole thread of philosophy since the Kantian scheme in the name of “correla-
tionism” which always presupposes the correlation or interaction between subject and object
in cognitive processes. The Thing in itself (Ding an sich) is a vanishing point of the perspec-
tive in Kantian philosophy, which the understanding (as frameworks of human cognition)
cannot reach. Although it is a dark zone within the reason, it cannot be accessed by human
knowledges. In other words, there is always a fatal gap between (human) subjects and (non-
human) objects in any philosophical system after Kant, in terms of both epistemology and
ontology. Then, is it possible to treat this gap as the very ground of a constitutive outside or
even materiality as such of what is being in/as the world? In this challenging question, this
project will proceed, to some extent, with Object-Oriented Ontology and Speculative Realism
in tandem.
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With the term materiality, I mean the unilateral determination by something with which
one cannot deal or has always certain difficulties within the very resistance from existential
or affective experiences of things. The unilateral determination presupposes the “base” as a
certain economy in which beings are situated within uneven or asymmetric relations that is
sanctioned and determined by rarity or scarcity of heterogenous moments (resources, mate-
rials, things, etc). Nature and environment can be relevant examples of this. For instance, the
concept of niche in biospheres gives rise to the very operation of biodiversity, as the deploy-
ment of multiplicity of the One, where a variety of bioregions such as watershed radically
and unilaterally determines activities and behaviors of living beings. Of course, Nature as
such is the result of reification and objectification from the human perspective. Nevertheless,
humans cannot comprehend and subsume all operation of it as a whole. Mesh-works and
assemblages within Nature are translated as an ambience that humans can somehow access.
The ambience is to be called the clone of Nature, which unfolds the unique cause as the deter-
mination-in the last-instance from the One and the Real. The One deploys itself as the
multiplicity (of varied niches and biodiversity) while it becomes an index of the multiplicity.
For Laruelle, ecosystem is more radically determinant than economy in a general sense
(Smith, 2013, p.113, 137, 144, 163).
The last instance is articulated and structured as a unilateral duality, that is never enacted
as empirical or historical. In the ultimate enlightenment as discussed in Izutsu’s Toward Zen
philosophy, for instance, there is no longer an interaction or correlation between subject and
object. Certainly, Izutsu admits a correlation between them in the early stage of cognition
(Izutsu, 1977, p.8), but in the last (and in fact, virtually current) moment of understandings,
it is deconstructed and surpassed. When one sees the flower, one also becomes the flower in
this last stage of knowledge and thinking. According to Izutsu’s interpretation of Zen Bud-
dhist philosophy, the ego is envisioned as a crystallization of the immanent relational field
or non-relational relation(Izustu, 1977, p.51). The subject in the conventional or standard
philosophy is just a hypothetical or rudimental stage of the ego as a (non-)relational field, if
it is not the clone or copy of it. In this stage of a newly organized and ordered world by the
ultimate knowledge, all entities are thoroughly differentiated and articulated. Although they
are not yet fixed and identified essentially (in terms of essences of things), they are mutually
transparent to each other. In this stage, the flower remains the flower but, at the same time,
is becoming or fusing into the bird, while the bird is still the bird but becoming or fusing into
the flower. This is the dimension of the One as a radical immanence. But it is always with-
drawn, which is situated as ‘the withdrawal-(of)-the-One or One-as-withdrawal’(POD, 99). 
Then what is a withdrawal? The word is originally translated from the German term
‘Entziehung’ in the context of Heidegger’s philosophy; especially in his Being and Time (Zein
und Zeit). All objects withdraw and recede from each other and at the same time do from all
relations among objects. The cognitive subject cannot touch objects directly, at least within
the circle of correlation between subject and object(Meillassoux, 2008, p.5). The world is
filled and packed with objects which withdraw from all relation(Harman, 2005, p.87). Thus
we cannot comprehend or grasp real objects and their relations. Harman’s argument of tool-
beings is helpful in this context. When one (as a human agency) uses a certain tool (as an
object), one can utilize it without any specific consciousness or intended attention. One can
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use it without any difficulty and identifying all relationships in which a tool/object is located.
In order that a tool can function and be operated smoothly, there is a related system which
articulates the relationship of each tool and object for the specific purpose of utilizations and
practices, that is the “as-structure” of beings which interrelates all objects retroactively. But
one cannot usually accept its presence. The present at hand (Vorhandenheit) of tools is never
contacted for users in the everyday consciousness and practices (unhandiness). The usage of
tool is too transparent to realize and so difficult to grasp the tool-system as mutual relations
to which it belongs. Only when a tool is broken or caught in malfunction, one can see its
tool-system as whole. On the occasion of using a broken tool, one can realize a presence of
tool-system as an uncovering of being in the Heideggerian sense. Paradoxically, The ready
to hand (Zuhandenheit, handiness) can exclusively present itself at the dysfunctional opera-
tions(Harman, 2005, 2010, p.99, 111, 2013, p.44, 184, Morton, 2013a).
The same can be said also in the case of human agency. Only when one is caught in
some kind of insufficiency and trouble in the everyday life, the very singularity or identity
of a particular individual can starkly manifest and unfold itself. The issue of “so-called mental
health” is definitely categorized under this framework. Then it should be noted that the term
withdrawal is the buzz-word in a completely different context. According to the official data,
there are almost 1.55 million persons who spend their life as hikikomori. They retreat from
the everyday routine through which “ordinary” people pass. Psychiatrists have tried to
explain this mass phenomena in terms of autism or as an Asperger disorder. Sociologists
interpret this as symptoms of the crises of both personality and community within contem-
porary society. Unfortunately, such interpretations are not enough, but these can be analyzed
from a more ontological perspective. In other words, it is possible to envision, hypothetically,
this phenomena through the same platform as with withdrawals of objects.
After all, objects aren’t only withdrawn from each other, but, rather, are withdrawn even
from themselves. Doesn’t the same hold for subjectivities in general? That is the crucial ques-
tion of this project. Of course, in this question, a certain subjective pole or agency is to be
envisioned in an objective pole of everything or every existence in the world. Thus the subject
is always defined as a certain kind of proto-objectivity. It can be said that even subjects are
a particular type of object, not something other than object, but instead, a proto-objectivity.
Morton goes so far as to proclaim, ‘we humans are objects!’(Morton, 2013a, p.149). In the
context of activism, recently, Bifo raised the idea of engaged withdrawal as a tactical option
in the contemporary political or cultural action under the dominance of neoliberal info-cap-
italism. He even suggests that what is at stake in the context of political or cultural activism
is not just about militant or violent acts but about medic postures, or rather ‘active with-
drawal’(Berardi, 2011, p.138, 177). Also in his many works, Hakim Bey (Peter Lamborn
Wilson) suggests that withdrawal can be one of the tactical choices of cultural or media
activisms in contemporary info-capitalism(Bey, 1996, p.8, pp.53-54). 
In order to develop the line of thought for this project, I will sometimes address literary
works. There is a famous essay on the arts by Jean Genet. Basically, it was written about Gia-
cometti’s works and his studio. The reason why I quote Genet here is not to apply a
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philosophical discourse (here especially inspired by the threads such as OOO, SR, NM and
ANT) on literatures. On the contrary, I suggest that some literary texts such as Genet’s
implies a certain sense of ontology of objects (or things).
‘The capacity to isolate an object and make its own, its unique significations
flow into it is possible only through the historical abolition of the one who is look-
ing……If I look at the armoire to know finally what it is, I eliminate all that is not
it. And the effort I expend makes me a curious being : this being, this observer,
stops being present, or even being a present observer: he continues to withdraw
into an indefinite past and future.’ (Genet, 2003, p.55, emphasis by myself) 
When we see some objects, the other beings beside it, even its surroundings disappear
or just recede behind the focused thing. An object cannot be present without a certain fond
or background contouring its figure, even if we are referring to absent objects. The absence
as such of objects can be regarded as another appearance of them within their surrounding
or ambience as a relational field, which is eliminated from humans perspectives at some
focused cognitions. (This aspect is analyzed by Sartre in terms of concept of “nihilation” in
his Being and Nothingness.) Objects and things exist in solitudes and consist each other by
alone, just as human agencies can happen to be in their own solitude as well. The adjective
‘curious’ in the quotation might have to be read strange as well. Because it is quite certain
that when one concentrates on something from the focused perspective (especially in writing
literary texts), one has to become something stranger than itself as objects. This posture as a
stranger might compel this observer (as a cognitive subject) to being absent and withdraw
into undifferentiated flows of time. Objects dive into, and sleep in, solitude by withdrawing
from the ostensively presented horizon, while the observer (subject) also recedes from the
same scene by stripping all historical traces away from both objects and its own agencies.
The time is becoming indefinite and imperceptible in both past and future, when objects are
perceived and conceived. There is always an asymmetry and unilateral relation. The onto-
logical kernel of some literatures such as Genet’s works lies in the potential of isolating
objects and becoming isolation of its own. In order to conclude the essay about Giacometti,
Genet says,
‘Giacometti’s art is not, then, a social art because it establishes a social
link——man and his secretions —— between objects; it’s rather an art of high-
class tramps, so pure that what could unite them might be a recognition of the
solitude of every being and every object. “I am alone”, the object seems to say,
“thus caught in a necessity which you can do nothing. If I am nothing but what I
am, I am indestructible. Being what I am, unreservedly, my solitude knows yours.’
(Genet, 2003, p.68)
What does it mean when he claims that ‘the object seem to say’? Can objects “say”
something? Of course, it is not a mere metaphor, but it implies some ontological conceptions.
Objects don’t relate or communicate with each other, but they can make contact through sep-
054 和光大学表現学部紀要　18 号・2018 年 3 月
aration or make allusions to each other unilaterally. When objects express themselves from
the hidden core (the Real) without representation or perform their deployment without per-
formation, objects seem to become or, at least, can be called, things, that assumes an uncanny
or dark core in the monstrosity of objects. Now it is necessary to make a conceptual distinc-
tion between objects and things.
In Japanese folklore discourse (minzokugaku) or ethnology, for instance, there is a spe-
cific notion of taboo called Monoimi, the ‘spiritually sanctioned aversion of things’. (In
Japanese, mono means things while imi means here religious aversion.) It is possible to ana-
lyze this concept in order to think about differences between objects and things, and also
about the spiritual or religious strangeness of objects or things in a certain context. When
Shinobu Orikuchi, a Japanese folklore writer and poet, employed the word, he had an onto-
logical idea in mind, not only using it as an ethnological or anthropological notion. Monoimi
means ‘keeping a distance from specific things. In a certain sanction, one tends to live by
avoiding attachments or contacts with some specific objects in certain temporary periods or
certain spatial fields. It is not to be achieved by human choices with free wills. Human agency
cannot fully control the distance from objects in the religious or spiritual context. Instead,
humans are compelled to be detached or distanced from objects by some strange force of
both repulsion and aversion. (It is known that Orikuchi had already read in detail and had
been inspired by sociologists and anthropologists such as Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert.)
Within or among communication or negotiation with objects, human happens to encounter
a form of excommunication or xeno-communication.
Similar to the case of broken tools, objects and their articulated relations which usually
remain invisible for human cognitions can be seen and appear during Monoimi at the period
of spiritual sanctions. In Monoimi, humans withdraw from objects, while objects withdraw
from humans. The object in the spiritual or religious sanction is not simply objects in the
conventional philosophical sense, but rather suggesting “strange objects” loaded with certain
affections of anxieties and fears. Here strange objects, for instance, are related or affiliated
to a mimicry or imitation (Monomane) or an apparition of monster or monstrous manifesta-
tion (Mononoke). Objects always retain some excessive force or parts within themselves,
which enriches its interiority than exteriority. In the case of social or ethnological taboo, there
is a strange force as the imperative of excommunicating humans from objects and its manner
of utilizations. I would like to call these strange objects with strange forces, the ‘thing’
(Mono). In Monoimi as the spiritual sanction, the thing is liberated from objects not only by
religious or spiritual sanctions but also through certain different regulations. In this case,
Orikuchi’s mono, the thing, is to be interpreted as the allusive effect enacted by objects.
Originally how do things, isolated from each other, as individuals relate to each other?
It is enabled by introducing the point of view of God, for instance. The notion of occasion-
alism is known in the history of western philosophy, which is linked to the name of a
philosopher in the 17th centuries, Malebranche. Things and objects recede from one another
and so never contact each other. However, they relate to each other partially. There can be
no contact in any immediacy but contact has to be mediated by something, where the medi-
ator is usually invisible. It is exactly by this absence or vanishment of the third term that
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things seem to accomplish partially immediate relations or temporary direct contacts. That
is to say, all phenomena and everything in Malebranche’s occasionalism are treated as effects,
occasions, means, medium, and resources of God. (Carl Schmitt found here the basis of the
political romanticism or theology which could employ everything for its own political pur-
pose.) Things which don’t relate to each other can relate, but it is ascribed to the operation
of God. This notion called occasionalism originates from Islamic philosophy, in which God
presents and emerge within everything.
Graham Harman insists on this point in his numerous books and works (3). In order to
separate this notion, inspired by medieval Islamic philosophy from Christianity, Harman
introduces the concept ‘vicarious causation’, which locates an invisible or indivine agency
at the position of mediating or relating moments in the world (4) — inspired by Alphonso
Lingis’s idea of “medium” (5) as a kind of glue which enables the whole carpentry of things.
Every object has a vacuum or even is a void. This vacuum, then, must contain and include
the world as such, which is called a certain milieu or medium in which mutually different
qualitative moments interact and flow bilaterally in a charged ether(Harman, 2005, p.94).
An object always has its hidden depth with spooky vibes in the encrypted core in itself, not
by a revealment (uncovering), but through an obscene/off scene, which is also called the
‘molten core’(Harman, 2005, Morton, 2013b, p.84, 86). Objects always hold a virtual dimen-
sion which is never subsumed or exhausted by any partial manifestation, which can be called
the “dormant parts” or the “dark zone” of objects. Certainly the world is packed with objects
which withdraw from all relation, but at the same time, these objects all embrace and inhabit
their own private void or vacuum. In other words, the world in which objects are settled is
filled with a ‘mutually isolated vacuum’(Harman, 2005, p.87, 97). Vacuum, void, and noth-
ingness in (real) objects are crucial for the recent philosophical debate. In the paradigm after
the ‘linguistic turn’, basically everything can be reduced to the discursive effect of language
as a capacity of significations. Nature is not yet articulated, not because it is a pure continuity
or undifferentiated chaos, but it is articulated exclusively according to the programs embed-
ded within itself. For instance, as instincts of living beings, not through linguistic articulations
to which humans are accustomed. Animals, plants, bacteria and slime molds are living in a
different structure of semantic articulation. The recent debate around OOO or SR and others
doesn’t necessarily rely on this view. However, a series of notions such as the void, empty
place and nothing (-ness) was sometimes significant even in the theories in human sciences
after the ‘linguistic turn’ (with its putative language-oriented ontology). As is visible in the
work of Levi-Strauss, what the notion of floating signifier suggests is the very potential of a
void point in the structure of articulation, or a point of ‘constitutive outside’ that enables and
empowers a given system. Even Sartre’s argument, which is usually read as the humanistic
discourse or too psychological existentialism, can be interpreted from this different perspec-
tive; ‘Nothingness can be nihilated only on the foundation of being; if nothingness can be
given, it is neither before nor after being, nor in a general way outside of being. Nothingness
lies in coiled in the heart of being——like a worm.’(Sartre,1956, p.56).
Historically, philosophy has problematized the gap between essence and appearance.
The question of how to deal with the issue is a crucial criteria for each philosophical system.
But now, the problem has shifted a bit. What is at stake here is the rift between ‘real objects’
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and ‘sensual objects’(Harman, 2005, 2010, 2013). Real objects can rarely be contacted and
retain uncanny cores or dark voids, from which they are launching, unfolding a kind of
plasma to their medium, elements, and levels, etc(Harman, 2005, p.97, 173, 190). Through
some notes of their own sensual objects, they allure others in a contact with distance, if not
directly related. In the allure, the causality among objects plays like magic, illusion and phan-
tasm, while objects behave like ‘playful children’ and the reality as such becomes a trickster
(Morton, 2013b, p.75). Instead of occasionalism by God, the hidden operation of allure is at
issue. The allure is a tactic of withdrawal.
In this manner, the withdrawn in OOO doesn’t mean a gesture to place itself (agency of
its engaged) behind the actual position. Withdrawal in this project doesn’t simply indicate a
difficult challenge to find yet a potency of being actualized, visualized and mapped out. With-
drawal is not something spatially or temporally hidden to be discovered retroactively. It
suggests more than some secrets behind or within. Instead, the withdrawal as a gesture is
always already beyond all sorts of access or any kind of explanation in a given territory. For
example, the series of coupling of hermit crabs and shells, octopodes and silos, spiders and
webs can all be raised as an example of activities of withdrawal in which these living beings
are slowly pulling themselves from their dark cell and rapidly moving toward the core of
vibrant relations with their surrounding. To retire or to draw themselves within the everyday
life is also the very posture of moving beyond the visible, perceptible and articulated in the
usual manner. Thus withdrawal crucially constitutes moments of being. In other words,
beings can happen to exist sometimes in the mode of withdrawal. The One presents and exists
as itself in the withdrawal, rather than being in the unveiled. Withdrawal withdraws just as a
singular event(POD, 89). This is a counterpart of Ereignis in Heideggarian philosophy. In
this way, the withdrawal is a form of non-relation, for all objects are strange(r) to each other
regardless of whether humans are concerned with their relations or not.
Deleuzian notion of the virtual is quite relevant for thinking and analyzing the with-
drawn dimension of objects. The notion of the virtual for Deleuze and Guattari does not
simply mean a latent agency, but rather, the virtual is about the potentiality of particular
objects, beings, and substances, although the virtual cannot be treated as their equivalents.
The virtual is a pure potential capable of assembling heterogeneous moments, which is also
defined as mesh-works or inoperative (non-productive or squandering) interconnectedness
of objects rather than the consequence of mere communications among subjects. Fruits of
nuts, for instance, don’t necessarily retain qualities or characteristics of its tree, but is deter-
mined thoroughly in its virtual potentiality as affording or becoming a piece of nut.The virtual
layer of objects can be consistent and immanent without being actual. Now it is possible to
afford the conceptual platform in which we can envision a series of notions : Kantian ‘Thing
in itself’, Freudian ‘lost objects’ or ‘objects of desire’, Lacanian ‘object petite a’ or ‘partial
objects’, Heideggerian things as a composition of logos, and finally Orikuch Shinobu’s
Mono, etc. Perhaps, the term coined by Timothy Morton, ‘hyperobjects’ is helpful for under-
standing the virtual force within things and objects as a “monstrous substances” (Mono)’(6).
Then what is hyperobject? It is defined as the invisible but omnipresently operative within
everything in the contemporary world. The more one tries to access and grasp it, the more it
evades. What things as hyperobjects, show us is not the intersubjectivity of humans who rec-
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ognize objects, but rather the ‘interobjectivity’ (7). It is impossible to comprehend the world
and Nature as a composited whole or ensemble. They are always spread as a sort of mesh-
works inextricably tied to the relational field. (I am tempted to call it assemblages in the
Deleuze & Guattarian sense, but this point is deserves to be further accounted for in following
chapters.)
Hyperobjects, as something beyond ordinary things, compel us to think about our sur-
roundings and lived environments. The wholeness of the world, not as its totality, attests that
human subjects as spectators or observers are also meshed and assembled within itself as one
of objects. In other words, the thing as a (hyper-)objective retains in itself a certain viscosity
which tends to cling on to other objects and humans in remaining itself invisible and untouch-
able. Certainly, it reminds us of the slime or viscosity in Sartre, but moreover it suggests to
us the varied phenomena such as global warming, outbreak of pandemics, radioactive pol-
lutions, and perhaps, even capitalism as such, etc, rather than psychological, existential or
hallucinative experiences of individuals(Morton, 2013a). Definitely Orikuchi’s notion of
Mono, thing, has something very common with such a hyperobjective characters. This issue
would be addressed and explored in some following chapter. 
For both Laruelle and Izutsu’s philosophical projects, some errancy or contestation
against the conventional thoughts is crucial. The notion of heresy is quite significant for Laru-
elle’s works, although Izustu has never utilized this term. But some unconventional thought
and heretic contestation in given philosophical systems are examined in his late works as
well. Generally speaking, an incomprehensible force of heresy is built within both philosoph-
ical projects as immanent conceptual rebellions. In Izutsu’s translocal approach of
non-religious philosophy, gnosis and its rebel posture are always implicated, even though he
might be a politically conservative thinker; belonging perhaps to the Right Wing camp. Put
differently, the spirit of struggle isn’t transcendental but real. Or it is possible to think about
a ‘transcendental rebel, comprised of struggles’? (SU, 89-90) But at least, the conceptual or
spiritual struggle is to be grasped as the heresy for thought itself. In Laruelle’s non-philoso-
phy, the identity in general is heretic itself in-persons with different perspectives. Surprisingly
he proclaims that ‘Identity is the cause-in-the-last-instance of heresy; heresy is the thought
and practice according to the cause-in-the-last-instance.’(FDH, 268, Italic is in original).
The living world is not directly given, but it is always given-without-givenness as the pure
heresy or heretical form of thought in unilateral duality(FDH, 271-272). So both gnostic
rebellion and class struggle are surprisingly combined in Laruelle’s philosophical view(FC,
11). In this perspective, the future is already given as in-Man itself, while the subject is the
recovery of the future as such(SU, 143). 
Laruelle’s conception of ‘future christ’ is about the elaboration of a heretical christ or
in-divine messiah, which is not confined to simple contestation in heresy or gnosis, but about
a permanent struggle toward the ‘vision-in-One’ or the ‘Man-in-Man’ by assembling both
orthodox principles and heretics in each religion(FC,28). The concept of ‘Man-in-
Man’, ’Man-in-person’ or ‘human-in-human’ is a very idiosyncratic term in Laruelle’s phi-
losophy. To a certain extent, it can somehow be translated as the “ordinary man” in sociology.
It indicates the person without attributes or proprieties (BOM, 9). Until the 1980’s Laruelle
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utilized the term ordinary man, but, after the middle of 1990’s, he gradually began to adopt
the series of terms above. Of course, although this terminology must deserve more consid-
erations in terms of gender and sexuality (8), it is a bit beyond the scope of this chapter, which
has to be considered some following section. Laruelle suggests that the ‘future christ’ means
a christian-organon within each man(FC,117). In each ordinary man or Man-in-person, the
cause of the subject is given, occasionally and partially, the shape of a subject-stranger(SU,
165). 
To become a stranger is not to be at home in the general condition of the contemporary
world. But in Laruelle, the stranger is defined as a radical subjectivity. In the same token, the
strange(r) is not an alienated mode of subject. Different from both sociological and philo-
sophical understanding, the strange(r) is itself immanent within the subject, so that its figure
is irreducible to a sociological or an ethnological stranger in general. The notion of the
strange(r) is not just supposed as something unfamiliar, but rather means a permanently
uncanny familiarity. (Morton, 2013a, p.124, Given Morton coined the term strange stranger,
my terminology here is inspired by him.) What is crucial here is not only demanding to be
“differentiating or detaching from oneself”, but also “becoming stranger to oneself”, because
anterior to be a subject, one (through/in the One) becomes the strange(r) as the radical sub-
jectivity, which mediates a non-relational relation of pure exteriority to the subject. The
strange(r) exi(s)ting in itself without any stable point of identification in the (historical)
world, in order to be separated radically through one’s immanence to oneself in the (living)
world. It is as operative as the non-identitarian identity, or separated without separation(FDH,
274). In Izutsu’s thought, it appears in the shape of “cosmic man” in the ultimate stage of
knowledge. In the very same way that all objects retain and hide some dark kernel or dormant
part in themselves, the subject always embraces or incorporates the strange(r) in itself. There
is no longer a dialectics nor interaction between the subject and the strange(r). This is exactly
the point in which the figure of strange(r) comes up with Laruelle’s non-philosophy and
Izutsu’s (non-)religious philosophy, by breaking the devision from philosophical decision
around sameness and difference or the self and the other. The strange(r) is not the figuration
of excluded other, but instead, is the name for the generic identity of human agencies. In this
sense, the strange(r) is no longer playing the game of specularity in duality, because exclu-
sively the subject, as the clone of the ego, can become the strange(r), insofar as the One
unilaterally determines individuals as the ordinary man (Man-in-person, human-in-human)
in its last instance. This vision echoes with Izutsu’s philosophical project.
In mythological thought in general, the shift from chaos to cosmos is always envisioned
as an equivalent to a passage from semantic undifferentiation , unarticulation, and indivision
to semantic differentiation and articulation. Izutsu set out the notion of anti-cosmos or anti-
sacred, instead of dealing with the dialectics between chaos and cosmos or celebrating chaos
in the mythological origin of religious faiths(Izutsu, 1994). Izutsu argued his notion of anti-
cosmos and his interest in Islamic heresy and mysticism, especially through his radical
interpretation of the Ismaili sect, which was one of the fractions within the “twelve Imam
school”, and established in the 11th centuries. They constructed firmed citadels in deserts
and mountains, one of which was called Alamut and quite notorious by their violent acts such
as assassinations against other Islamic sects or dynasties and also Christian crusaders, etc.
059The Ontology of Withdrawal (1) : What is a withdrawal?
the Ismaili sect treated all enemies and opponents arrownd them as heretic or evil agency.
However, this sect was also aware of being seen and recognized as the heretic and pagan
from the perspective of other religious groups. This is the very root of anti-cosmos — in
which chaos and cosmos are constantly alternating their positions with infinite speeds. Or it
can be stated that chaos unilaterally determines, and fuses into cosmos, in its immanence and
consistency. I am almost inclined to call this anti-cosmos, chaosmosis in the Guattarian
sense(Guattari, 1995). The Ismaili heretic vision also assumes a gnostic perspective to a cer-
tain extent, while Izutsu’s notion of anti-cosmos retains gnostic idea, from which the world
is always envisioned as evil or incomplete. In this manner, both Laruelle’s non philosophy
and Izutsu’s non-religious philosophy have some gnostic moments in common. Just as Marx-
ism is inseparable from its failure as much as it is irreducible to it, all philosophy and
religions can establish themselves through gnostic negation or struggle against their own
ground. Gnostic struggle is the rebellion or insurrection without principles. Laruelle even
goes so far as to equate it with class struggle(FC, 11).
In the history of Islamic thought and mysticism, the (hidden) Imam is a very intriguing
concept invented by Ismaili sect, which is comparable to Laruelle’s ‘future christ’.The posi-
tion of Imam cannot be ascribed to the position of priest, prophet or guru, but rather defined
as a sort of spiritual sovereignty. The reason why Izutsu paid such great attention to the notion
of Imam as an Islamic messianic leader or heretic spiritual charisma in the mystic politics of
the Ismaili sect is due to the significance of the figuration of the strange(r). Though the Imam
isn’t divine, but being throughly human while not have any filiation with Muhammad through
blood lineage, nevertheless, it was evaluated as a singular and privileged person by other
people. In the conception of Imam, the godhood or divinity is simply living within an ordi-
nary person. Imam such as “Hasan the old man” in the mountain as the leader of the fortress
Alamute is nothing but ‘conceptual personae’ for Izutsu’s (non-religious) philosophy, espe-
cially in his elaboration of the concept of anti-cosmos. 
The heretic subject, by passing through and beyond plural threads of religions, cultures,
and spirits, is an agency that ceaselessly enters into immanent struggles, which are inclined
to opt for a rebellion or insurrection with its unilateral cause. This struggle always precedes
any concrete or practical politics, because it brings the everyday living into the status of given
without givenness in order to settle its own relation with the world. Surprisingly, Laruelle
contends that this radical form of democracy is equivalent to communism! At least, philos-
ophy utilizes science more explicitly to think itself: it excludes science from itself as the State
excludes foreigners to set up the differential identity of its own citizens. A nation-state needs
the people who are excluded in order to know itself philosophically. In the same vein, every
philosophical system establishes and constitutes itself by excluding other systems and being
distinct from science, while non-philosophy tends to be in fusion with science, via quantum
physics(FDH, 308). So the rebel is determined unilaterally as a part of duality that formulates
the clone of opponents to establish and gain its own identity. In this sense, human is a rebel
in the struggles without principles toward/through anti-cosmos. From the point of view of
non-(religious) philosophy, one can become a rebel, heretics, and strange(r)-subject in the
world, regardless of ideology and politics. 
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